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Lawyers' Poker
STEVEN LUBET*
I. INTRODUCTION
Neither history nor anthropology can tell us with certainty whether
trials resemble games or games resemble trials. The similarities are
often noted and beyond question. Both games and trials are contests in
which winners are declared. Both depend upon formal rules and set pro-
cedures, and both occur in separate, designated spaces where these spe-
cial rules apply. Trials, of course, are deadly serious (for the
participants, if not the observers), while games are, well, games-a
combination these days of fun and commerce, but focused always on an
irreducible core of entertainment (someone has to enjoy it or it isn't
really a game).
The Dutch cultural historian Johan Huizinga believed that games
came first; indeed, that play actually precedes humanity:
Play is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined,
always presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for
man to teach them their playing. We can safely assert, even that
human civilization has added no essential features to the general idea
of play. Animals play just like men.'
Whatever the accuracy of this zoological observation, it is surely
the case that human play has taken on cultural attributes that are discon-
tinuous with the tussling of, say, bear cubs. Huizinga identified numer-
ous attributes of such play, most of which-though not all-apply also
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Please note that this essay uses female
pronouns for all card players, game players, and athletes; it uses male pronouns for lawyers and
witnesses. Copyright Steven Lubet 2003.
I. JOHAN HUIZINGA, HoMo LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE 1 (1950).
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to trials. "First and foremost," according to Huizinga, "play is a volun-
tary activity. Play to order is no longer play: it could at best be but a
forcible imitation of it."2 This is in sharp distinction to trials, where at
least one party is always a coerced participant. But this one differ-
ence-forcible imitation-simply emphasizes the salience of Huizinga's
other factors to both games and trials.
Neither activity is "ordinary," since both involve "a stepping out of
'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition of its
own."3 Both have defined beginnings and conclusions-"at a certain
moment it is 'over."' 4 Both occur within "sacred" spaces that are
"marked off beforehand." These are "forbidden spots, isolated, hedged
round, hallowed, within which special rules obtain."5 Moreover, both
games and trials bring order to an imperfect world. Indeed, Huizinga
posits that play "is order," in that it creates "a temporary, limited perfec-
tion" that may be spoiled by deviation from the rules." 6 The rules them-
selves create "fairness," which is essential to both games and trials.7
Writing a decade after Huizinga, the French philosopher Roger Cal-
lois identified one type of play as agon (Greek for contest), comprising
that group of competitive games,
in which equality of chances is artificially created, in order that the
adversaries should confront each other under ideal conditions, sus-
ceptible of giving precise and incontestable value to the winner's tri-
umph. It is therefore always a question of a rivalry which hinges on a
single quality ... exercised, within defined limits and without outside
assistance, in such a way that the winner appears to be better than the
loser in a certain category of exploits.8
A trial fits almost perfectly into Callois's definition of agon, with
its emphasis on confrontation in an idealized setting. In theory, at least,
a trial seeks a precise outcome, in which the better, and hopefully more
deserving, side always wins.
Callois's theories of play make the comparison to trials even
stronger. For example, Callois points out the importance of "doubt" in
the structure of games: "Doubt must remain until the end . . . . An
outcome known in advance, with no possibility of error or surprise,
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id. at 10.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 11.
8. ROGER CALLOIS, MAN, PLAY, AND GAMES 14 (1961). "In principle, it would seem that
agon is unknown among animals, which have no conception of limits or rules . I..." ld. at 15.
Callois's other fundamental categories of play are alea (games of chance), mitnicry (illusion and
play-acting), and ilinx (vertigo, from swings to roller coasters). Id. at 19-23.
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clearly leading to an inescapable result, is incompatible with the nature
of play."9 Games, then, depend on the creation of "doubt," and rules
allow "the powers of the contestants [to] be equated."'"
Trials likewise depend on doubt, lest they become mere (tyrannical)
formalities. The concept of justice itself depends upon the perception
that a trial is not a foregone conclusion, but rather a forum for the deter-
mination of disputed facts by an open-minded-that is, doubting-trier
or judge."
A. The Language of Games and Trials
For all that, analogies between games and trials are inevitable. An
easy case is a slam dunk, and a perfect cross examination really scores
points. An overbroad document request is a fishing expedition, while a
fortunate discovery hits the daily double. An inscrutable judge hides the
ball, but if you complain to the court you might find yourself skating on
thin ice, when all you really want is a level playing field. Alas, some-
times your opponent stoops to dirty pool, which might sorely tempt you
to follow suit. The language of games seems to inform almost every-
thing we do in law practice: preparation (coming up with a game plan);
negotiation (jockeying for position); witness examination (putting the
ball in play); oral argument (fielding a question); refusing to settle (roll-
ing the dice); winning (scoring a knock out); and losing (striking out).
Interestingly, the analogies almost all run in one direction-per-
haps because games are more primal, more accessible, and more popular
than trials. Whatever the reason, there are few, if any, legal metaphors
in sports or games. We don't speak of pitchers cross-examining hitters
or bridge players delivering arguments. An angry coach might read
"chapter and verse" to her underperforming players, but she would not
"file a motion" or "cite precedent." True, an umpire's "verdict" may
sometimes be "reversed on appeal," but those tropes are not metaphors
at all. Rather, they reflect the reality that some sports are, in fact,
judged.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id.
11. Like Huizinga, but in a more organized fashion, Callois identifies the necessary qualities
of play, of which he concludes there are six in number. Only the first-its non-obligatory
nature-fails to apply to trials as well. According to Callois, play is separate; circumscribed
within limits of space and time. It is uncertain, in that its course and result cannot be determined
beforehand. Play is also uncertain, in that it creates neither goods nor wealth, other than the
exchange of property among the players. It is governed by rules. Finally, play is make-believe,
accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality that is different from real life. This last
feature may strike some as inapplicable to trials, which are part of real life and have real life
consequences. But they are nonetheless make believe in Callois's sense, since they reconstruct
reality as though on a stage. Id. at 9-10. In sum, Callois's analysis leads to the conclusion that
trials resemble play, except that trials are obligatory, thus rendering them a sort of forced play.
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This linguistic observation leads to the ultimate question. Recog-
nizing the impact that the language of games has had on the language of
trials, to what extent might games themselves provide useful lessons for
trial strategy?
This is not a question about the academic study of "game theory."
Scholars in that field have long posited that their models can predict
behavior in all sorts of human activities, from business '2 to international
relations' 3 to tort litigation. 4 Almost none of it, however, has filtered
down to actual courtrooms, at least in any advertent sense. While the
argument can be made that litigators naturally employ game theory
(after all, where does the theory come from, if not practice?), there is
virtually no professional literature urging lawyers to run computer simu-
lations or engage game theory consultants for even the biggest trials.
Nor do practicing attorneys make a habit of speaking in the language of
economic modeling. You will never hear real lawyers bemoaning a pris-
oner's dilemma or worrying about the tragedy of the commons. But you
will hear them complain when the court moves the goal posts, thus leav-
ing them stuck behind the eight ball (and perhaps forcing them to punt).
In truth, most games, especially sports, have little relevance to trial
strategy. Apart from a few universal bromides-keep your eye on the
ball; run to daylight; hit 'em where they ain't-there are very few prac-
tical lessons that are transferrable from recreation to advocacy, since
advocacy is primarily intellectual rather than physical.
There is one game, however, that definitely provides a useful tem-
plate for law practice.
And that game, of course, is poker.
B. Poker Playing and Poker Theory
There is an undeniable, though imperfect, symmetry between litiga-
tion and poker, in that each involves competitive decision making with
incomplete information. In poker, a player must continually decide
whether to raise, call, or fold without seeing some or all of the other
12. See, e.g., KALYAN CHATTERJEE & WILLIAM SAMUELSON, GAME THEORY AND BUSINESS
APPLICATIONS 1 (2002) ("Provided the game-theoretic description faithfully captures the real-
world competitive situation at hand, game theory provides a compelling guide for business
strategy.").
13. See, e.g., PIERRE ALLAN & CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT, GAME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: PREFERENCES, INFORMATION, AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 1 (1994) ("There is no
question today that the class of non-cooperative games provides a simple and elegant framework
for depicting situations where there exists a combination of conflict and cooperation among
countries.").
14. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 7 (1998) ("We model the
interaction between the motorist and the pedestrian by using a traditional game theory model
called a normalforn game, sometimes referred to as the strategic form of the game.").
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players' cards. There is always a certain amount of public information
in the form of exposed cards (except in draw poker) and, more impor-
tantly, in the betting behavior and physical demeanor of one's adversa-
ries. The main objective in poker is almost always to deceive the other
players by misrepresenting your own cards-often by showing strength
when your cards are weak (thus bluffing the others into folding their
hands), or by showing weakness when your cards are strong (thus
encouraging others to keep betting when they cannot win). Even hon-
esty in poker is deceptive. A strong hand played strongly allows one to
bluff more easily later in the game.
Nonetheless, there are underlying poker ethics, summed up by the
phrase "cards speak."' 5 In other words, the best cards always win for
those who remain in the game through the final round of betting.
Thanks to the laws of probability, every player has an identical chance
of drawing winning cards. The decision about whether to stay in the
game is freely made by each player, as all have equal access to precisely
the same information. While deception is at the heart of the game, some
shady tricks, such as "string betting,"' 6 are prohibited. Absent cheating,
there are no alliances or side deals, and no secret swapping of
information.
Law practice, and litigation in particular, shares many of these
characteristics. Most importantly, lawyers must make a constant series
of decisions based upon a mix of available and unknown facts. The
most obvious such decision is whether to settle or proceed to trial, but
there are also many other, smaller decisions along the way-which dep-
ositions to take, which motions to file, which theories to pursue, which
questions to ask-each one influenced to one degree or another by
opposing counsel's behavior. The best lawyers, like the best poker play-
ers, have a knack for getting their adversaries to react exactly as they
want, and that talent tends to separate the winners from the losers.
In poker, every mistake costs money-which makes it a terrific
15. RICHARD HARROCH & Lou KRIEGER, POKER FOR DUMMIES 228 (2000). Anthony Holden
tells this story about a player nicknamed after a good luck charm:
When I showed my straight, Rabbit's Foot threw away his cards; but they flipped
over just short of the muck to reveal a pair of jacks. The dealer took a long, slow
look at them while the loser shrugged his shoulders, picked up his rabbit's foot and
prepared to leave. He thought he had a pair of jacks. In fact, he had wound up with
a straight higher than mine. At this game, as they say, "cards speak," so the dealer
did his duty and pointed out to the departing stranger that he had just won a pot ....
ANTHONY HOLDEN, Bic DEAL: ONE YEAR AS A PROFESSIONAL POKER PLAYER 216-17 (2002).
16. In a string bet, a player throws chips into the pot in installments-thus allowing her to
observe reactions before completing her play. This is illegal; the player's bet is therefore limited
to the initial amount thrown into the pot. A. ALVAREZ, POKER: BETS, BLUFFS, AND BAD BEATS
125 (2002) [hereinafter ALVAREZ, POKER].
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heuristic. 7 A poker player of even moderate skill knows instantly when
she has misplayed a hand. Moreover, she is immediately able to calcu-
late the exact cost of the mistake. Because poker involves a relatively
small number of variables-there are only fifty-two cards in the deck,
and only three possible moves in each round of betting-a player can
assess every aspect of her game ruthlessly and with considerable accu-
racy.' 8 There is no kidding yourself in poker; you either win or lose.
Lawyers have more trouble with self-assessment, and not only
because of ego involvement and self-delusion. Every lawsuit has
thousands of factors, and no case exactly duplicates any other. What's
more, most litigation comes to a fairly indeterminate end via settlement,
while ultimate negotiating positions remain unrevealed. It is therefore
difficult to say whether, and to what extent, one has won or lost. Even
in those few cases that go to trial, thus producing a clear winner, there is
no easy way to identify which decisions worked and which failed.
In law practice, the many, many dependent variables defy isolation.
Consequently, even the most well-recognized truisms can neither be val-
idated nor falsified. Never ask a question unless you know the answer.
Sounds right, of course, but can it be proven? Save your strongest argu-
ment for rebuttal. Makes sense again, but aren't there exceptions? The
opening statement is the most important part of the trial. This one has
become a legend, but is it really true?
In contrast, poker maxims are constantly being tested and retested.
Many of them are based on clear mathematical calculations, and others
have been validated in practice. Capable poker players know the precise
odds of filling an inside straight (they're crappy, don't try it)'9 or com-
pleting a flush when you draw three suited cards in seven card stud
(pretty good, worth betting).2"
In short, poker wisdom represents real insight into the workings of
the game, including the all-important techniques of "representing" your
17. HOLDEN, supra note 15, at 96.
18. There are 2,598,960 different possible five-card combinations in a fifty-two card deck,
which might at first make the game seem exceptionally complicated. JOHN VON NEUMANN &
OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcONOMic BEHAVIOR 186, 187 (1953). In reality,
however, the overwhelming majority of those hands are unplayable "rags," consisting of unpaired,
unsuited, nonsequential cards that must be folded at the first opportunity-and that occurs long
before all the cards are dealt. In Texas Hold 'Em, for example, only two cards are dealt before the
initial round of betting, so that there are only 169 meaningfully different combinations (a draw
containing the jack of diamonds and four of hearts, say, is functionally identical to the jack of
clubs and the four of spades). KEN WARREN, WINNER'S GUIDE TO TEXAS HOLD 'EM POKER 43
(1995). Moreover, only about eleven combinations are considered "premium hands," meaning
that they have a strong positive expectation of winning, and only forty are even considered
"playable." ANDY BELLIN, POKER NATION 122-23 (2002).
19. DAVID SKLANSKY, SKLANSKY ON POKER 64-65 (1999).
20. WARREN, supra note 18, at 199.
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hand to maximize its value. Poker is extremely popular, played by as
many as sixty million Americans, 2' and every player has a cash incen-
tive to improve the quality of her play. Consequently, it is no surprise
that there are scores of books devoted to poker strategy and technique."
Most of them are of the standard how-to-do-it variety, 23 but there is also
a substantial amount of poker journalism, 24 and even a category that
might be called poker literature.2
The practical theoretics of poker will be immediately recognizable
by every lawyer who has ever made a strategic decision in the face of
uncertainty. And, as it turns out, there are indeed many poker tactics
that can be applied to comparable situations in law practice.
II. MAXIMIZING VALUE
Poker, like litigation, is all about winning. Naturally, then, the
most important lessons from poker are the ones that focus on maximiz-
ing gains, both long run and short. Some of these lessons may seem
fairly obvious once explained, but several are significant because they
are counter-intuitive.
A. Saving Bets
The first and potentially most difficult lesson for novice poker play-
ers is that the bets you don't make are at least as important as the ones
you do. Maybe more. Since you cannot possibly win every hand, or
even a large plurality of hands, a major key to success lies in minimizing
your losses when you are dealt weak cards. As Andy Bellin puts it,
"The biggest mistake inexperienced poker players make is thinking that
the only way to make money at poker is to win more hands. They have
not recognized that the best way to make money is by minimizing your
losses by folding more frequently."26
21. ALVAREZ, POKER, supra note 16, at 22.
22. Amazon.com lists 129 poker books, and there are many others on card games in general.
23. DAVID SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF POKER (2001); WARREN, supra note 18; MIKE CARO,
CARO'S BOOK OF TELLS: THE BODY LANGUAGE OF POKER (2000); HARROCH & KRIEGER, supra
note 15. The last, Poker for Dummies, suggests an interesting question. Notwithstanding the
popularity of the series, shouldn't dummies do everything they can to avoid poker?
24. A. ALVAREZ, THE BIGGEST GAME IN TOWN (1983) [hereinafter ALVAREZ, THE BIGGEST
GAME]; LARRY PHILLIPS, ZEN AND THE ART OF POKER (1999); MASON MALMUTH, POKER ESSAYS
(2000); SKLANSKY, SKLANSKY ON POKER, supra note 19.
25. JAMES MCMANUS, POSITIVELY FIFTH STREET: MURDERERS, CHEETAHS, AND BINION'S
WORLD SERIES OF POKER (2003); BELLIN, supra note 18; MICHAEL KONIK, TELLING LIES AND
GETING PAID (2001); ALVAREZ, POKER, supra note 16; HOLDEN, supra note 15. Yet another
genre uses poker as a metaphor for, say, urban romance (JILL DAVIS, GIRLS' POKER NIGHT (2002))
or high finance (MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL
STREET (1990)), but with no real discussion of the game itself.
26. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 84.
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It costs money to play a hand, and more money the longer you stay
in it. Consequently, it saves money to fold a bad hand as early as possi-
ble, and it saves the most money if you fold before calling a single bet.
A common strategy, therefore, is to play only "premium hands," mean-
ing those that you have the best chance of winning.
This approach is called "tight" play, and it is not without some
problems (discussed later), but it is far better than the frequently seen
alternative of calling a few early bets and then folding when the action
becomes more intense. Those first few futile bets are virtually wasted
money, and they can add up significantly over the course of a game." It
is usually (though not always-again, more later) far better to select a
few potential winners and then play them through to the end, while sit-
ting out all the rest.
On one level, of course, it is easy to see that lawyers may prosper if
they avoid losers in their case selection. Personal injury attorneys, who
work for contingent fees, have been employing this sort of triage for
years. On the other hand, large firm lawyers, who bill big clients by the
hour, have little personal incentive to fold a losing hand so long as the
meter is running-though their clients might see things differently.
In any event, the value of minimizing losses is less apparent, and
therefore more important, at the micro level in an individual case.
Although they will seldom admit it, many lawyers are insecure about
their choice of tactics. Rather than draft a sturdy, single count com-
plaint, a lawyer will freight it up with multiple counts, many just repeat-
ing the same basic allegations, simply out of fear of waiving a valid
claim. The same insecurity leads counsel to overload appellate briefs
with numerous trivial arguments, rather than concentrate on a few good
ones.
Of course, all sorts of handbooks caution against this sort of "loose
play," warning that unnecessary claims and arguments inevitably detract
from the good ones. Still, lawyers keep doing it, no doubt because the
cost is inappreciable. No court would explicitly base its judgment on the
inclusion of a trivial or futile argument in the losing party's brief.
Though the wasted pages in an age of strict limits would have been
better spent on more salient points, there is little way to reckon the direct
price of flabby drafting.
As one poker maven observed, complex events (such as Texas
Hold 'Em and, though he didn't say it, judicial decisions) are highly
sensitive to initial conditions. 8 Using a sort of applied chaos theory, he
noted that "tiny differences or defects occurring at the beginning of [an]
27. WARREN, supra note 18, at 72.
28. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 25.
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event become exaggerated as the event goes along,"29 and therefore can
spin rapidly out of control. His conclusion, equally applicable to poker
and law, is that "the best way to control chaos is at the beginning of the
event."'30 Folding a bad hand, or eliminating a pointless argument, will
invariably limit future losses. It is therefore an "invisible form of
winning."31
Nonetheless, lawyers continue to ignore the sage advice of their
elders and the exasperated entreaties of the courts, larding their briefs
and pleadings with repetitive and feckless verbiage. A few hours of
seven card stud, however, might better drive home the virtues of tighter
play.
B. Positive Expectations
If poker's first lesson is to reduce betting on bad hands, the second
lesson must be how to recognize good ones. There are relatively few
true premium hands, i.e., guaranteed winners that should be exploited
for all they are worth (that is also a subtle art, discussed below). Then
there are the "playable hands," good enough for betting in some situa-
tions but not in others, depending on the competition. How do you
decide whether to bet-and how much to bet-on a playable hand?
As prolific writer David Sklansky explains, "To achieve the desired
results, it is necessary that most of your poker plays have what is called
a positive expectation," meaning that it will "show a profit in the long
run."
32
An expectation is the mathematical likelihood that a bet will be
successful. An expectation is positive when the potential payoff exceeds
the size of the bet; similarly, it is negative when the probable return is
smaller than the bet itself.
In even the simplest case, you need to consider three variables in
order to determine the relevant "pot odds": the amount of the raise, the
likelihood of success, and the size of the pot. For example, imagine that
you are holding four cards to an open-ended straight, with one card yet
to be dealt. Your chance of completing the straight is 17.4%, or slightly
better than six to one.3 3 Now assume that there has been a bet to you of
ten dollars, and you must decide whether to call or fold. Are you willing
to risk ten dollars on a six to one shot? It depends on the payoff-in this
case, the size of the pot. Only if the pot is larger than sixty dollars, does
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 14.
32. SKLANSKY, SKLANSKY ON POKER, supra note 19, at 39.
33. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 31.
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the bet have a positive expected value, in which case you should call (or
perhaps even raise, as we will discuss later). Otherwise, it has a nega-
tive expectation and you should fold.3 4
Note that the expected value of a bet is not dependent on winning
or losing the specific hand. In the example above, the odds are that you
will lose the hand five out of six times, with a total cost of fifty dollars.
Winning the sixth time, however, brings in sixty dollars, for a net gain of
ten dollars. Consequently, the bet is worth making because it has a posi-
tive expectation-and the bigger the pot, the greater the expected value.
The crucial calculation is whether the play will win quite a bit more
when it works that it will lose when it fails. 35
Of course, the equation is often more complicated, since you have
to factor in the odds that your opponent's hand might also improve (or
conversely that she is bluffing). What are the chances that you can fill
your straight and still lose,3 6 or that you can miss your straight and still
win?37
The concept of expected value has enormous utility for lawyers,
because it can help us see beyond some timeworn axioms, finding
opportunity where it might have eluded us.
For example, everyone recognizes the ancient admonition to cross-
examiners: Don't ask a question unless you know the answer. This fits
right in with the first rule of poker, which is to minimize your bets.
Playing only premium hands is the equivalent of asking only surefire
questions. But just as the idea of expected value expands the universe of
playable hands, it also increases the number of viable questions.
Imagine, for example, that you represent the plaintiff in an intersec-
tion accident case, and that you have called the defendant driver to tes-
tify as an adverse witness. Assume also that-for whatever reason-the
defendant's deposition was never taken, so you do not know the answers
to many important questions. Following the usual principles of cross
34. Based on their ability to calculate precise odds and bet only on positive expectations,
many successful poker players claim that they are not "gamblers" since they do not wager on
unpredictable outcomes. As Anthony Holden puts it, "Poker, I had always argued, was not a form
of gambling; on the contrary, gambling was a style of playing poker-a loose and losing style at
that." HOLDEN, supra note 15, at 180. The fabled Amarillo Slim put it more colorfully, "I don't
bet on hunches because I don't believe in hunches. Hunches are for dogs making love." Id. at
253.
35. SKLANSKY, SKLANSKY ON POKER, supra note 19, at 39.
36. This can happen if your opponent fills a flush (about a five to one shot) or draws a full
house (nearly eleven to one) on the last card. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 31.
37. This can actually happen any of three ways: (1) you might draw a high pair that is good
enough to win; (2) your opponent might be bluffing, holding a rag hand worse than yours; or (3)
you could raise on your four card straight, causing your opponent to fold a better hand. The last
possibility, called semi-bluffing, will be discussed later infra.
[Vol. 57:283
LAWYERS' POKER
examination, you would not ask whether the defendant had his brakes
checked in the previous twelve months, because you cannot control the
answer.
Following poker theory, however, you would quickly see that the
question has a positive expectation. Perhaps nine out of ten times the
defendant will reply that his brakes were recently checked, meaning that
your bet failed. Nonetheless, the loss is minimal, since the driver might
still have been negligent in many other ways. In the tenth case, where
the witness admits lax maintenance, the gain is substantial. It was a
good question because of its positive expected value.
But not every unpredictable question is worth asking; some have
negative expected value. Assume that you ask the driver a more contro-
versial question-was he speeding on the way to an illicit affair? His
negative reply will no doubt be delivered with a good deal of appropriate
indignation, and the judge might even rebuke you for your lack of a
good faith basis for the question. The damage to your credibility will be
considerably greater than the expected gain from such a stab in the dark.
True, the occasional positive answer would hurt the defense, but that
would not be nearly enough to outweigh the damage from the many
times when you come up empty.
A poker player would characterize the difference between these
two questions-auto maintenance versus adultery-as a distinction
between betting for value and betting for action.38 The first question is
tightly controlled; the only possible answers are yes and no, either one
of which can be accommodated. Its expected value is both positive and
predictable. In contrast, the second question is highly volatile. It
unleashes a host of possibilities, most of them unfavorable. It is auda-
cious, but not valuable.39
Sklansky summarizes the theory of expected value this way. Any-
time you make a bet "where the odds are in your favor, you have earned
something on that bet, whether you actually win or lose the bet," but by
the same token, when you make a bet "where the odds are not in your
favor, you have lost something, whether you actually win or lose the
bet."40
38. KONIK, supra note 25, at 79.
39. The theory of expected long-term value raises an additional problem for lawyers because
they are not "playing with their own money." This difference between law practice and poker-
which an economist would characterize as an agency problem or moral hazard-is discussed
infra. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
40. SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF POKER, supra note 23, at 10.
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III. INFLUENCING OTHERS
It is important to control your own conduct, making only wise bets
and folding when the odds are not in your favor. The other key to suc-
cess lies in influencing the behavior of your opponents, causing them to
fold when they might beat you and to keep betting when they are sure to
lose. This ability separates the adequate players from the truly skillful.
David Sklansky expands on this idea at some length. Recall that a
player strives to bet only in situations that offer a positive expectation.
While she may precisely figure the odds of filling or improving her own
hand, her opponents' complete hand remains unknown. If she knew all
the cards, of course, she could always make the mathematically correct
play. Any player who deviated from the correct play would reduce her
mathematical expectation and increase the expectation of her oppo-
nent.4" The art of poker, therefore, lies in filling the gaps in the incom-
plete information, to allow you to make the correct play, while
simultaneously preventing your opponents from learning any more than
you want them to know about your hand.
This leads to Sklansky's perceptive "fundamental theorem of
poker":
Every time you play a hand differently from the way you would have
played it if you could see all your opponent's cards, they gain; and
every time you play your hand the same way you would have played
it if you could see all their cards, they lose. Conversely, every time
opponents play their hands differently from the way they would have
if they could see all your cards, you gain; and every time they play
their hands the same way they would have played if they could see all
your cards, you lose.42
Thus, you want to base your own decisions on valid information
about your adversaries, while depriving them of any opportunity to do
the same. The key to this process is the interpretation of betting behav-
ior. You want to read your opponents' bets as accurately as possible
and, perhaps more important, you want to make your own betting behav-
ior inscrutable.
In poker, a bet is both an action and a signal. The action consists of
adding, matching, or declining to match the addition of a certain amount
of money to the pot. That act also provides information about your level
of confidence in your hand-a signal about your strength and intentions.
Ideally, following Sklansky's fundamental theorem, you would want to
accomplish two objectives with each bet. First, you would want to make
the "correct" move in light of your opponent's cards-folding if she has
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 17-18.
[Vol. 57:283
LAWYERS' POKER
you beaten, increasing the pot if you are likely to win. Equally impor-
tant, you would want your bet, in its "signaling" capacity, to induce your
opponent to make an incorrect move-calling when she is sure to lose,
folding if she holds winners.
In litigation, each "play" has a similar dual character. A litigation
move has an instrumental purpose-presenting a motion to the court,
objecting to a document demand, asking a deposition question.
Unavoidably, each act also includes a signal. For example, resistance to
a document request has the performative effect of denying (or at least
delaying) discovery to the other side. As a signal, it also conveys infor-
mation, however ambiguously or unintentionally. Perhaps the resistance
means that you are planning to play hardball, whatever the cost. Perhaps
you are hiding a smoking gun. Perhaps you are exploiting access to an
unlimited litigation budget by running up the tab. No matter what the
case, it is inevitable that your opponent will attach an extrinsic meaning
to some or all of your maneuvers. Consequently, you will be most suc-
cessful if you can influence and predict your opponent's interpretation,
and therefore reaction, to each signal.
This phenomenon can be seen most clearly in negotiation and set-
tlement. Every offer, including the first, is an act of independent legal
significance. It can be accepted, creating a binding contract and thereby
ending the negotiation. More realistically, early offers act as signals,
partially revealing but not fully disclosing your true bottom line. The art
of negotiation lies in correctly reading your adversary's intentions ("I
can tell he will go higher") while obscuring you own ("final offer").
More complex negotiations will include throwaways and sweeteners,
terms of little importance to you that are either withheld or proffered to
gain concessions from the other side. Again, success depends upon cre-
ating the impression that you hold these items dearly, even if you do not.
Thus, you will give away the least while influencing your adversary to
offer the most.
A. Know Why You Are Betting (and Why You Are Not)
It may seem obvious that you bet in poker, or anywhere else,
because you think you will win. That is the functional role of betting,
putting up a stake to be matched by your opponents in a wager that you
expect to win. But it is not nearly that simple. As we have seen, each
bet also has a secondary purpose as a motivator, intentionally conveying
a fragment of information to the opposition, in the hope that they will
respond to your benefit. According to Bellin,
To simplify a very complicated concept, there are basically two pur-
poses to betting. The first is fairly self-evident. You want other peo-
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pie's money. Therefore, if you genuinely believe that your hand is
the best, you want to bet and raise so you can increase the amount of
money contained within the pot.
The other reason you bet-and raise-is to narrow the field.
You eliminate some, or all, of the competition and therefore have a
better chance of winning. It's important to remember that these two
concepts are often counterproductive. The more people you play
against, the more money there is at stake. But at the same time, the
more people participating in a hand, the less likely it is that you'll
hold the winning hand.
Expanding on this concept, Sklansky identifies four basic reasons
for betting, only the first of which ("to get more money in the pot when
you have the best hand"43) is instrumental. The other reasons, to varying
degrees, are meant to influence the opposition: driving out other players,
bluffing, and gaining information from the others' responses.44
In other words, you bet for the purpose of influencing the other
players. Your bets can either bring money into the pot (when other play-
ers call), or keep money out of the pot (when other players fold). Play-
ers who fold do not pay you, but they cannot beat you. Players
contribute money to the pot when they call, but they may end up out-
drawing you and taking it for themselves.
How does one resolve the betting dilemma? Should you bet
aggressively and drive players out, even at the cost of a much smaller
pot? Or is it preferable to bet cautiously, or not at all, thereby encourag-
ing others to stick around and raise the stakes? As you might guess,
there is no single correct answer. Rather, the best approach depends
upon an intricate assessment of both the cards and your opponents'
attitudes.
In brief, the optimum strategy is to misrepresent your hand, thereby
causing your opponents to play their hands incorrectly. The better your
cards, the less aggressively you bet. If your hand is unbeatable ("the
nuts," in poker slang), you do everything you can to indicate weakness,
"slow playing," in the hope that the second best hand will begin raising
aggressively. When you do bet or raise, you will want it to look like a
bluff, encouraging inferior, though perhaps pretty good, hands to raise
back. If you hold a weaker hand-good enough to keep playing, but not
a sure winner-you will probably show strength, betting and raising to
drive out the competition. This is especially true when your hand is
incomplete but potentially powerful, say four cards to a flush or an
open-ended straight. The chances of filling your hand may be pretty
43. Id. at 121.
44. Id. Warren adds a fifth reason, disguising your hand. WARREN, supra note 18, at 100.
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good (usually between thirty to fifty percent odds if there are two cards
yet to be dealt 5), but there are never any guarantees. Consequently, you
may play as though you have already made your hand, encouraging the
competition to fold. This is called semi-bluffing, since you can win
either by forcing everyone else out, or by actually drawing the winning
card.
The point is that winning players evaluate the consequences of each
bet, measuring it against a complex matrix of possible results. They are
betting not only on the value of the cards, but also on their opponents'
predicted reactions. Better players engage in the further calculation of
"pot odds," assigning a long-range expected value to each bet. The best
players are able to vary their technique to avoid predictability-some-
times they play strong hands strongly (which makes their subsequent
bluffs more convincing); sometimes they intentionally fold winners (to
encourage other players to bluff with weak hands, planning to call them
later, in larger pots).
With that in mind, let us now turn to cross examination. Again, the
handbooks caution brevity, advising lawyers to cross examine only on
sure points, and as few of those as feasible. And again, too many law-
yers persist in conducting long, searching, counterproductive cross
examinations. Why do they do this? Because they haven't followed
Bellin's rule. They don't know why they are betting.
As lawyers know, the purpose of cross examination is not to gather
information, but rather to tell a story. The goal of a good cross examina-
tion is to extract useful answers from a (usually) uncooperative or
unwilling witness. In essence, the lawyer wants to be the narrator,
explaining his client's case, with the witness merely providing the nec-
essary affirmation of the lawyer's points. Witnesses resist. Having been
called by the opposing party, they are often resentful or wary of the
cross examiner, if not genuinely biased or hostile.
In essence, every cross examination question actually represents a
bet. The lawyer wagers his control of the witness (and personal credibil-
ity) against the chance of a favorable answer. Some questions are low-
risk, designed to encourage cooperation and keep the witness in play.
Aggressive questioning raises the stakes, increasing the possibility that
the examination will backfire. The witness may become recalcitrant or
uncooperative, or the jury may be alienated by the attorney's
browbeating.
As in poker, success depends upon an accurate assessment of the
likely response. Some witnesses are naturally cooperative, and can eas-
45. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 31-32.
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ily be led wherever counsel wants to take them. Some witnesses have to
be "disciplined" by tough questioning, while others will simply be
intimidated into sympathy-engendering silence.
Thus, every question has both a potential positive value (in terms of
getting an answer), as well as a potential negative cost (clamming up the
witness, incurring the judge's or jury's anger). The values, however, are
not constant, varying from witness to witness, and even within the pro-
gression of a single cross examination.
This underscores the utility of Bellin's insight. All raises are not
the same. Just as there are multiple contradictory purposes for betting,
there are multiple contradictory techniques for cross examination. The
lawyer's challenge is to match the technique to the occasion.
Imagine, for example, that a witness's direct examination has
changed a small but relatively important detail from her deposition testi-
mony. Does the lawyer want to impeach her? And if so, when? This
decision can be approached by recalling the default rule in poker betting:
Show strength when holding a weak hand, bet slowly when holding
great cards.
Thus, if the lawyer believes he has little to gain in the cross exami-
nation (weak cards), he may want to impeach the witness sharply and
immediately. On the other hand, if the witness is likely to be useful to
the lawyer's own case (strong cards), the impeachment may cost more
than it delivers, by essentially driving the witness out of the game.
Even when the impeachment is absolutely essential, counsel must
still decide where to situate it in the cross examination. An early
impeachment, like a large opening bet, is likely to have the most power-
ful impact. It might succeed brilliantly, disciplining the witness into
eager compliance. But it is also more likely to boomerang, in any of
several ways: It might generate sympathy for a witness who, at the out-
set of the examination, does not yet seem to deserve harsh treatment. It
might provoke an otherwise tractable witness to become unnecessarily
contentious. Worst, it might fail with a thud, putting the lawyer on the
defensive and tipping the scales in favor of the witness for the balance of
the cross examination.
The trial advocacy books (mine included) caution against impeach-
ing witnesses unnecessarily.46 Poker theory provides an additional way
to quantify the decision. You do not impeach a witness just because you
can, in the same way that you do not bet strongly simply because you
hold good cards. Sometimes "slow playing" is the right way to go-
46. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 153-58 (2d ed. 1997).
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allow the witness to remain uncontradicted, the better to keep him in
play.
B. Bluffing and Misdirection
Bluffing may well be the most misunderstood aspect of poker. The
popular image of the bluffer is someone who makes a practice of betting
massively on rag hands, using bluster and braggadocio to bully other
players-who are fearful of calling the bluff-out of the pot. In this
scenario, bluffing is the signature style of certain players, who invariably
attempt to win by domination.
Nearly every aspect of that description, however, is inaccurate. In
fact, the most artful bluffing is a means of distraction, not domination. It
is part of a comprehensive, long-term strategy employed as a means of
preventing other players from ever accurately gauging the strength of
any particular hand. It is fairly evident that bluffing is most successful
when it is indistinguishable from betting for value. The corollary is less
obvious; betting for value is most effective when it is indistinguishable
from bluffing.
The surest way to win money in poker is to convince other players
to bet against you when you hold the better hand, the precise opposite of
bluffing. Not being idiots, most players will not do this intentionally;
they have to be lured into it. Bellin explains it this way:
In its most rudimentary form, poker is a game where one player says,
I am willing to bet that my hand is better than yours. It takes another
player to doubt that, to assume that his hand is actually the best, for
the game to continue. If you play ... very mechanically, where the
amount you are willing to wager increases proportionately with the
strength of your hand-then as a player, you become extremely pre-
dictable. Other players would be able to accurately guess the strength
of your hand as soon as you made a wager. The only time you would
ever have a bet called (and possibly make more money than the ante)
is when you actually hold the weaker hand, which makes for a really
long night.47
Players who raise only on "the nuts" will quickly find themselves
with no callers, resulting in the paradox that the very best cards will win
the smallest pots. Effective play, therefore, requires that opposing play-
ers always doubt your intentions. They have to wonder whether you are
betting from strength or from weakness. When you play your cards
right, they will guess wrong-folding when they should call and calling
when they should fold.
The necessity of varying your play virtually requires occasional
47. BELUN, supra note 18, at 76-77.
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bluffing, or representing much greater strength than your actual cards
justify. Game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morganstern, in
their classic academic analysis of poker, conclude that bluffing is an
essential component of optimum strategy because it conveys "confusing
information" to the opposition.48
In fact, the creation of doubt results in four possible outcomes,
three of which produce positive profits. If you are betting from strength
and your opponent folds, you will win a relatively small pot. If you are
betting from strength and your opponent calls, you will win even more.
If you are bluffing and your opponent folds, you win. Finally, if you are
bluffing and your opponent calls, you lose. Or do you?
Bellin's insight is that there is a great strategic value to occasion-
ally getting caught-it demonstrates that "you have the capacity to bluff.
It's like an advertising budget."4 9 Since you always want other players
to believe that you might be bluffing, they have to see you actually do it
once in awhile. And the more often you are caught, the more often they
will call your bets, and even raise them. The trick, of course, is to strike
the right balance, so that your play will always come as a surprise and
the opposing players will always be off guard.5"
In litigation, there is no precise parallel to bluffing, since the oppos-
ing side rarely simply folds. What's more, there is seldom an advantage
to be gained by inducing the opposition to continue playing-it is usu-
ally much better to obtain their maximum offer as early as possible.
Nonetheless, there is a reasonable analogy in the process of pre-
trial negotiation, especially as it is played out in the course of discovery.
While the ostensible purpose of discovery is to exchange information in
preparation for trial, in reality it is much more a "settlement dance,"
where the parties bluff and posture about the strength of their respective
cases (and witnesses) in order to extract the maximum offer from the
other side. Discovery tactics can be either aggressive (resisting disclo-
sure) or accommodating (volunteering information). Lawyers who inva-
48. VON NEUMANN & MORGANSTERN, supra note 18, at 188-89.
49. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 80.
50. The poker authorities disagree regarding the optimum situations for bluffing. Warren
advises more active bluffing on large pots and at high stakes, presumably because the bigger
payoff justifies the risk of failure. WARREN, supra note 18, at 138-39. Harroch and Krieger,
however, suggest bluffing when the pot is relatively small, since your opponents' pot odds will
then favor folding. HARROCH & KRIEGER, supra note 15, at 76. More analytically, Alvarez points
out that a bluff is most effective when it changes the pot odds for your opponent, thereby making
it disadvantageous to call your bet. ALVAREZ, POKER, supra note 16, at 76. Thus, bluffing would
work better earlier in the hand, when the pot is smaller in relation to the betting limit. This tactic,
sometimes called stealing the ante or stealing the pot, does not really have an exact analog in law
practice.
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riably follow a single approach become predictable, and therefore lose
the ability to influence their opponents' settlement position.
For example, some attorneys are vigorous, nearly to the point of
obstructionism, in defending depositions. Lawyers who invariably fol-
low this approach quickly develop reputations as blusterers, and no one
takes them seriously. Thus, their own constancy renders the technique
ineffective. But what happens when such a lawyer uncharacteristically
encourages his own witness to begin volunteering during a deposition?
The departure from the norm may become freighted with meaning, sug-
gesting that the lawyer has exceptional confidence in both the witness
and the case, which might in turn cause the opposing side to reconsider
its view of settlement.
Then again, the unexpected turn toward cooperation might be, in
effect, a bluff-intended only to convey a contrived attitude of confi-
dence. Opposing counsel, however, will have no way of measuring the
true meaning of counsel's move, but will surely have to wonder what he
is up to. Sometimes that uncertainty may lead to reevaluation and even
self-doubt.
Bellin draws the poker player's conclusion that there is no such
thing as an unsuccessful bluff. "If it works, fantastic, you win the
pot."'" And if it doesn't, you have at least laid the groundwork for
enhancing your winnings in the future.
This principle has to be amended for lawyers. Let's say, there are
no unsuccessful surprises.
C. Truth
Despite all the talk of bluffing, deception, and misdirection, poker
is ultimately a game of objective truth. The cards speak; they are what
they are. A full house always beats a flush, with no additional interpre-
tation or subjectivity. Any player is always free to call any raise, requir-
ing the bettor to show her hand. And while bets may be intended to
induce insecurity or intimidation (or the opposite), they are also truthful,
in the sense that each bet is physical-chips into the pot. In poker, you
put your money where your mouth is. No threats, no contingent
promises, no secret deals.12 You may disguise your intentions, but you
cannot change the facts.
51. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 80.
52. As is always the case when significant amounts of money change hands, there is
substantial cheating in poker, as there is in law, politics, business, and even religion. See BELLIN,
supra note 18, at 139-58 (describing various means of cheating); ALVAREZ, POKER, supra note 16,
at 34-37 (explaining that cheating was synonymous with poker from its earliest days); KONIK,
supra note 25, at 90 (quoting W.C. Fields, that "anything worth having is worth cheating for").
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In a manner familiar to all lawyers, poker players engage in the
artful manipulation of truth. Perhaps the greatest example of this was a
famous play by the legendary Jack "Treetop" Straus, winner of the 1982
World Series of Poker.53
The play came in a round of Texas Hold 'Em, a challenging game
in which each player must make the best possible five-card hand by
using any combination of their own two hole cards and another five
communal cards that are dealt face up for use by everyone. The hole
cards are dealt first. After the hole cards are dealt, there is an initial
round of betting. Then the first three communal cards are dealt face up
(the "flop"), followed by another betting round. Next a single commu-
nal card (the "turn") is dealt, then betting, then the last face-up card (the
"river"), then the last betting round.
In this particular game, Straus was dealt the worst possible hole
cards-a deuce and seven of different suits.54 Ordinarily, a good player
would fold such a hand, but Straus kept playing. The three card flop
consisted of a seven and two threes, giving Straus two pair (sevens and
threes), but also giving everyone else a pair of threes to work with.
Anyone with even a moderate pair in the hole (higher than sevens)
would beat Straus's hand. That clearly appeared to be the case, when
another player aggressively raised $5,000, indicating a very good hand.
Straus nonetheless called, even though he was virtually certain that he
was up against a better hand (in fact, the other player was holding jacks
and threes). The next up card (the turn) was a deuce-that gave Straus
three pair, though it did not improve his hand, since only five cards can
be used.
At that point, Straus bet $18,000, more than triple the amount of
any previous bet in the no-limit game. The other player, who had been
betting assertively, suddenly paused. How could a deuce have helped
Straus so much? While the other player was thinking it over, Straus
leaned over the table, smiling. "I'll tell you what," he said, "You give
me one of those little old $25 chips of yours and you can see either one
of my hole cards, whichever you choose."
The other player hesitated, then tossed Straus a chip, as he pointed
to one of the hole cards. Straus turned it over, revealing a deuce. The
conclusion seemed obvious. Straus must have a pair of deuces in the
hole (why else would he offer to show either card?), giving him a full
53. This story was first told by A. Alvarez in The Biggest Game in Town, and has since been
repeated in many other poker books. This version is taken from Alvarez's more recent text.
ALVAREZ, POKER, supra note 16, at 83.
54. The deuce and seven are the two lowest cards that cannot possibly be combined into a
five-card sequential "straight."
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house, deuces over threes. His opponent folded and Straus won the pot
with an inferior hand. Note that he would have achieved the same out-
come if his opponent had selected the other card, a seven, since that also
would have indicated that Straus was holding a full house, sevens over
threes.
The point of this story, in case it isn't obvious to non-card players,
is that Jack Straus won the hand (and became a poker immortal) by
voluntarily revealing information, not by concealing it. Showing his
hole card was an aggressive show of strength that forced the other player
out of the game.
But there was even more to the strategy than that. Good players
seldom show their hole cards, so why didn't the other player recognize
Straus's move as a bluff? That was due to another masterful bit of
reverse psychology. The opposing player reasoned that Straus wanted
him to think he was bluffing, in order to get him to dump another
$18,000 into the pot. "If Straus wants me to believe he's bluffing," the
loser's thinking went, "then he must really have the cards." Folding,
therefore, was the only rational decision.
This parable might actually cause lawyers to rethink the standard
strategy for deposition defense, which typically emphasizes withholding,
rather than revealing, information. Lawyers who litigate "by the book"
usually caution their witnesses to give short, spare responses-prefera-
bly in monosyllables-rather than educate the opposition. As one lead-
ing handbook puts it, "[t]here is no sense sharing information with the
other side when there is no requirement of doing so."55
But the effectiveness of Straus's strategy-aggressively disclosing
information-suggests that you might well want the other side to know
about your quality of your witnesses, the better to influence their settle-
ment posture. 56 According to negotiation theory, the strength of one's
position is a major determinant (perhaps the major determinant) of the
55. DAVID MALONE & PETER HOFFMAN, THE EFFECTIVE DEPOSITION 198 (2d ed. 1996). See
also HENRY HECHT, EFFECTIVE DEPOSITIONS 157 (1997) (advising, "motivate the witness to keep
the answers short"); BRADLEY CLARY ET AL., SUCCESSFUL FIRST DEPOSITIONS 73 (2001) (stating
that one should "[a]dvise deponents to keep their answers as short as possible and to avoid
volunteering information not requested in the question"); L.J. CHRIS MARTINIAK, HOW TO TAKE
AND DEFEND DEPOSITIONS 338 (2d ed. 1999) (advising one to "give the truthful, responsive
answer that is the minimum answer consistent with credibility").
56. A negotiator should "assess the available information to judge the likely goals the other
side may have, as well as the options they are likely to have identified as meeting these goals."
THOMAS GUERNSEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION 35 (1996). "Negotiators must
similarly attempt to understand the strengths and weaknesses possessed by their own clients and
by their adversaries." CHARLES CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 52
(2d ed. 1993). "You should also think about the alternatives to a negotiated agreement available
to the other side." ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 105 (2d ed. 1991).
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outcome. The shorthand term for this concept is BATNA-best alterna-
tive to a negotiated agreement.57 The better your perceived BATNA, the
better your negotiated result.5 8 Of course, the opposing party cannot be
intimidated by your BATNA unless they know about it. Thus, a good
deal of any negotiation must be devoted to a detailed description of your
powerful case (without details, it would just be unpersuasive brag-
ging). 9 And what is it that makes your case so compelling? One factor
would certainly have to be the strength of your witnesses and the quality
of their expected testimony, and therefore the likelihood that you will
prevail at trial. There may be no better way to educate the opposition
than by showcasing your witnesses at their own depositions. Rather than
preparing your witnesses to give short, obtuse answers, you might
accomplish more, a la Jack Straus, by encouraging them to tell what they
know, explaining why you represent the winning side.
In other words, good things can happen when you show your hand.
D. Tells
Lawyers, judges, and jurors all think they can read body language,
correctly separating the reliable witnesses from the lying scoundrels.
There is a near absolute faith, both professional and popular, that one
need only "look the witness in the eye" in order to distinguish honesty
from mendacity.6" Indeed, this notion is enshrined in the law of the
appellate process, where it is a truism that a trial court's determination
of credibility lies beyond all review.
In fact, however, most research shows that people have only ran-
dom success at recognizing falsehoods on the basis of demeanor.6'
Studies have consistently found an extremely high error rate in recogniz-
ing deception. Observers are wrong between thirty and sixty percent of
the time, and no profession does better than any other. Judges, police
officers, social workers, and psychiatrists all tend to score in the same
overall range as the general public.62 Nonetheless, people continue to
57. FISHER & URY, supra note 56, at 97-106.
58. "The better your BATNA, the greater your power." Id. at 102.
59. "The more detail you provide to support you position, the more persuasive it will usually
be." GUERNSEY, supra note 56, at 101.
60. This claim was repeated over and over, for example, in the impeachment trial of President
Clinton as the House managers sought permission to bring witnesses to the well of the Senate.
"Wouldn't you want to observe the demeanor of Miss Lewinsky and test her credibility[?]," urged
House Manager Ed Bryant, "Look into her eyes[?]" Senate Expected to Allow Questioning of 3
Witnesses, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1999, at 1.
61. Erica Goode, To Tell the Truth, It's Awfully Hard to Spot a Liar, N.Y. TIMES, May I 1,
1999, at D1.
62. One set of tests has been given to police officers, customs examiners, judges, trial
lawyers, and psychotherapists, as well as agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central
[Vol. 57:283
LAWYERS' POKER
express great confidence that they can identify verbal and nonverbal
conduct that will reveal another's true intentions.
As far as I know, there has been no study of truth detection that
specifically included poker players in its sample. Such a survey would
be interesting indeed, since poker players are adamant about their profi-
ciency in "reading hands," meaning that they can figure out another
players cards and betting strategy on the basis of unintentional "tells."
As Sklansky confidently explains, "The ability to read hands is the most
important weapon a poker player can have. 63
Mike Caro, the self-described "mad genius of poker," puts it this
way:
Once you've mastered the basic elements of a winning poker
formula, psychology becomes the key ingredient separating break-
even players from world-class superstars. The most profitable kind
of poker psychology is the ability to read your opponents. Look
closely and you'll see opponents giving away the strength of their
hands just by their mannerisms. Any mannerism that helps you
determine the secrets of an opponent's hand is called a tell.64
There is no doubt that capable poker players can, in fact, read their
opponents.65 They can deduce what cards you are holding, figure out
whether you are bluffing, and determine the exact move that will cause
you to fold (or raise). The stories are legion of poker masters who used
three levels of logic and reverse logic to pull off an unlikely bluff or to
call, correctly, when the odds seemed disastrous.66
What is their secret? Is there really a psychic gift, or perhaps finely
honed intuition, that allows poker wizards to see through bluffs and
detect deception, exercising a talent that eludes ordinary judges and
jurors? And if there is such a skill, how might a trial lawyer acquire it?
In fact, champion poker players are able to read their opponents
with considerable accuracy. This skill comes with years of experience,
reflection, and insight-not to mention the talent necessary to take
Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms. On average, the subjects-all of whom are expected to be able to weed out deceit in
their professional lives-were able to distinguish lying at a rate of fifty percent, exactly what they
would have achieved through random guessing. Malcolm Gladwell, The Naked Face, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 5, 2002, at 38.
63. SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF POKER, supra note 23, at 221.
64. CARO, supra note 23, at 17.
65. Michael Konik, who considers himself a proficient but not great player, tells a story in
which he correctly read an opposing player's hand and successfully inveigled him into talling bets
when he should have folded. KoNIK, supra note 25, at 199-202.
66. See ALVAREZ, POKER, supra note 16, at 90 (telling the story of champion Doyle Brunson
folding a full house when he correctly deduced that his opponent had quad deuces; and quoting
Amarillo Slim Preston that "if you can't fold the winning hand, you can't play poker").
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advantage of experience, reflection, and insight.67 Additionally, there
are four aspects to the game of poker that allow this ability to develop.
Unfortunately for lawyers, however, only one of these elements has any-
thing approaching a corresponding component in law practice.
The first poker-specific factor is certainty. At the card table, every-
one is behaving deceptively, or at least trying to, all of the time. Thus,
you never have to determine whether someone is attempting to mislead
you, but only how and in what manner. Even the most cynical lawyer,
however, would have to agree that most witnesses tell the truth most of
the time. Different factual accounts are usually the result of failed mem-
ories, poor observation, or honest differences of opinion-none of
which exist in poker. Thus, distinguishing truth from treachery is
immeasurably more difficult in law practice, because you are regularly
confronted with both. In poker, there is only treachery, which makes
matters considerably easier.68
The second factor is simplicity. Although there are over 2.5 mil-
lion conceivable hands in poker, only three or four will be even remotely
possible in any given play. Moreover, the actual question will usually
boil down to a simple yes or no. Does your opponent have the cards, or
is she bluffing? Thus, the choices are relatively narrow, making them
that much easier to read. At trial, in contrast, the scope of possible
deception is nearly limitless, and hardly ever black and white. Wit-
nesses may testify in various shades of gray about timing, intention,
emotion, location, sequence, and other matters of interpretation. The
testimony may be a complex jumble of truth, wishful thinking, artful
construction, and outright prevarication. Alas, there is nothing binary
about it.
Moreover, poker allows nearly instant validation of one's suspi-
cions. If you think someone is bluffing, based on a "tell" or some other
factor, call her bet and find out. She will have to show her cards, so you
can determine immediately whether your suspicion was accurate.69 In
law, there is no reliably similar method of external verification (if there
were, we would use it instead of holding a trial). The fact finder will
either trust or discount the witness's testimony, in what becomes a self-
fulfilling analysis. Witnesses are untrustworthy because no one believes
them. Yes, witnesses are sometimes caught in lies, or are successfully
67. According to Malcolm Gladwell, certain individuals do seem to be gifted at reading facial
expressions, scoring "off the charts" on various tests. "Most of us aren't very good at spotting it,"
says Gladwell. "But a handful of people are virtuosos." Gladwell, supra note 62, at 38.
68. "Poker is the ultimate monument to the anti-Musketeer code: Every Man For Himself
(and be sure, while you're at it, to kick the other guy when he's down)." HOL.DEN, supra note 15,
at 71.
69. CARO, supra note 23, at 13.
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impeached, but that is usually because of inherent inconsistencies in
their testimony, not because a lawyer or judge has identified a valid
''tell."
Finally, we come to a factor that can be useful to lawyers, although
not as might be expected. For all the talk of reading hands and watching
tells, it turns out that the single most important determinant is familiarity
with your opponent's playing style. According to Caro,
Through the analysis of tells we are trying to understand how players
behave and what this reveals about their motivation. One of the first
steps in discovering tells is for a player to develop a sense of the
baseline behavioral repertoire of one's opponents.7°
The baseline, he continues, needs to be observed over time so that
meaning can be attached to repeated anomalies:
Again, by cataloging the baseline behavioral repertoire of individual
players, one can begin to recognize "deviations" from normal pat-
terns and develop a second sense, a "feel" for something not being
entirely correct. In any case a novice poker player, or an experienced
poker player who enters a new game with unknown opponents,
should use his calls as a kind of behavioral experiment. You have
paid not only to see a hand, but you have paid to see the quality of the
hand and how it was played.'
Bellin explains that he has compiled his own player-specific "book
of tells" over a period of twenty years, cataloging the tics and giveaways
of everyone with whom he has ever played.72 "Obviously," he says,
"the more familiar you are with a player, the longer you play against
them [sic], the easier they are to read. Over time, you make notes about
their play, and eventually you will be able to predict their actions. ' '71
Since poker games move quickly, with as many as thirty-five hands
per hour,74 there is ample opportunity to observe one's opponents.
Familiarity with playing style can build rapidly, especially in "regular
games" with the same players every week.
Lawyers seldom have this luxury with witnesses, most of whom are
not repeat players. Only in fairly unusual circumstances will an attorney
have the opportunity to establish a witness's baseline behavioral reper-
toire. Thus, the interpretation of a witness's mannerisms and demeanor
inevitably remain at the level of supposition, if not outright guesswork.
There is a lesson for lawyers in the art of reading poker tells, but it
is an ironic one. Lacking the advantages of certainty, simplicity, and
70. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 13-14.
72. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 98.
73. Id. at 104.
74. WARREN, supra note 18, at 48.
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validation, lawyers should rely on tells primarily in situations of signifi-
cant familiarity-rare as those might be.
IV. LIFE AIN'T POKER
Despite the many strategic similarities between poker and law prac-
tice, there are many equally important-probably more important!-
unbridgeable differences.
A. Clients and Moral Hazard
In poker, there is a single "right play" for every situation, based on
the concept of expected value. The right play optimizes your eventual
return, even if it fails in a given situation, because the odds imply that
eventual gains will outweigh losses.
This works because poker success is measured in the long run, not
in a single game, and certainly not on the basis of a single hand. Daily
performance is inconsequential.75 In fact, professional poker players
view their careers as a single, unending game, in which they are either
ahead or behind. As one championship player explained to Alvarez,
I mean, how long is a poker game? If you play for a living, there is
no end to it. Just because it breaks up doesn't mean it ends. The
players go away, but they are still thinking about it .... And they'll
be there again the next day. Them or someone else.76
Poker players can take the long view, absorbing losses in the name
of expected value, because they play with their own money. The long
run for them is continuous because the profits and losses are all from the
same pocket.77
Lawyers, on the other hand, have clients, most of whom are not
repeat players. Clients' interests are completely episodic. The client
wants to win the current case, and doesn't care if your calculated tactic
will succeed fabulously for some other client down the road. Therefore,
most clients only recognize current value, not expectations.
This does not mean that the concept of positive expectation is use-
less to lawyers, but rather that it must be measured on a shorter time
frame, in the context of a single case. As an agent, the lawyer must
pursue his client's interests, being careful not to sacrifice them for his
own gain or the gain of another. This requires lawyers to be far more
conservative than poker players when it comes to banking on the odds.78
75. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 129.
76. ALVAREZ, THE BIGGEST GAME, supra note 24, at 75.
77. SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF POKER, supra note 23, at 6.
78. Certain high volume personal injury lawyers, of course, are known to take dozens of
marginal cases on the theory that a small fraction of them will pay off. This is a fairly close
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B. Zero Sum
Poker is the classic zero sum game. There is only so much money
on the table, to be divided by skill in the course of play. Every player's
gain comes at the expense of another player, with no room for compro-
mise or negotiation. The sole purpose of a poker game is ruthlessly to
take your adversaries' money.79 You win or lose. Period.
While some lawyers approach litigation as trench warfare, wise
counselors understand that their clients may be better served by settle-
ment, if only to eliminate moral, emotional, and economic transaction
costs. Litigation may spiral downward into a negative sum game (mak-
ing zero sum look pretty good) in which even the technical winners
come out behind. Decent lawyers strive to avoid these results (even if
being paid by the hour).
Apart from litigation, much law practice is devoted to structuring
transactions for mutual gain, in which the competitive strategies of
poker would be disastrously out of place.
C. Lying
Michael Konik's book, Telling Lies and Getting Paid, emphasizes
the surreal nature of the gambling life, in which the ordinary rules of
human interaction are suspended if not obliterated. Once the cards are
fairly dealt, poker values deception, concealment, subterfuge, trickery,
and outright lying. Even peeking is not prohibited,8" so long as you
have not stacked the deck8' or shorted the pot.8" Some writers claim that
poker's elemental competition strips bare "a man's character" by
revealing "makeshift metaphors for the human condition."83
But no matter what anyone says, poker requires duplicity, and
therefore can never be a model for life or law. Poker writer Mike Caro
touts himself as the founder of the "Mike Caro University of Poker,
Gaming, and Life Strategy."84 I have never examined the course cata-
logue, but we can only hope that latter part of the title is tongue in
analog to the poker player's concept of expected value. Note, however, that in accepting a case
the lawyer is acting on his own behalf, thus there is no moral hazard. Once a case has been
accepted, the lawyer must handle it advantageously to the client without regard to future
expectations in other cases.
79. ALVAREZ, THE BIGGEST GAME, supra note 24, at 16.
80. MALMUTH, supra note 24, at 163; BELLIN, supra note 18, at 156.
81. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 139.
82. You short the pot when you intentionally throw in fewer chips than called for by the bet.
Id. at 149.
83. HOLDEN, supra note 15, at 91-92.
84. CARO, supra note 23, at 5.
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cheek. A life strategy, or law practice, based on poker skills would be a
disaster.
Andy Bellin is far more candid, admitting that poker has ruined
nearly "every relationship I've ever had in my life" because "coming
home at four in the morning smelling of booze and cigarettes, with a
couple of thousand dollars less in my pocket than I left the house with,
just ain't good for a relationship."85 He goes on in that vein for pages,
debunking the romantic myths of the gambling life. Michael Konik says
the same thing, more bluntly: "In poker you have to lie to win; in life
telling lies will only make you lose."86
And in law practice, that will also get you disbarred.
V. CONCLUSION
Is there a final useful lesson to be drawn from the theories of
poker? Perhaps it would be "maximize your winning by minimizing
losses," or "avoid predictability," or even "study the odds." In each
case, the principle is that luck is ephemeral, eventually favoring no one.
Some situations, however, can be recognized and evaluated on the basis
of expected value, especially when you consider your opponent's likely
response. In these circumstances, at the raw intersection of game theory
and human psychology, there are often identifiably preferable-even if
counterintuitive-courses of action.
Or you could put it this way: "Depend on the rabbit's foot if you
will. But remember, it didn't work for the rabbit."87
85. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 206.
86. KONIK, supra note 25, at 174.
87. BELLIN, supra note 18, at 188.
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